King County (Teamsters Local 763), Decision 10183 (PECB, 2008)

 

STATE OF WASHINGTON BEFORE THE PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS COMMISSION
TEAMSTERS LOCAL 7 63,
Complainant,	CASE 21633-U-08-5520
vs.	DECISION 10183 - PECB
KING COUNTY,
Respondent.
TEAMSTERS LOCAL 7 63,
Complainant,	CASE 21634-U-08-5521
vs.	DECISION 10184 - PECB
PUBLIC SAFETY EMPLOYEES UNION,	FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW, AND ORDER
Respondent.

Reid, Pedersen, McCarthy & Ballew, by Kenneth J. Pedersen, Attorney at Law, for Teamsters Local 763.

King County Prosecuting Attorney’s Office, by SusanSlonecker, Senior Deputy Prosecuting Attorney, and Gretchen Herbison, Labor Relations Specialist, for the employer.

Schwerin Campbell Barnard & Iglitzin, by Kathleen Phair Barnard, Attorney at Law, for the Public Safety Employees Union.

On April 3, 2008, Teamsters Union Local 763 (Teamsters) filed a complaint charging unfair labor practices against King County (employer). The Teamsters alleged employer interference and domination under RCW 41.56.140(1) and (2) in connection with employer actions soon after the Public Safety Employees Union (PSEU) filed a representation petition with the Public Employment Relations Commission (PERC).[1] In a second case filed the same day, the Teamsters alleged that PSEU violated RCW 41.56.150(1) and (2) by inducing the employer to commit unfair labor practices, and by otherwise interfering with employee rights. The cases were consolidated, and a hearing was conducted May 29, 2008, in Kirkland, Washington. Briefs were filed to complete the record in this case, and an expedited record was ordered under the “blocking charge” rule.

ISSUES

1.         Allegations against Employer:

Did the employer interfere with employee rights and unlawfully assist a labor organization after the filing of a decertifica­tion petition by agreeing to and promising economic benefits in the event the incumbent union was voted out?

Did the employer interfere with employee rights by making agreements with an organization other than the exclusive bargaining representative?

Did the employer interfere with employee rights by directing individual computer searches as a result of a request for information from the Teamsters?

Did the employer interfere with employee rights and assist a labor organization by making misrepresentations regarding the ability of a newly certified bargaining representative to negotiate for retroactive pay?

2.         Allegations against PSEU:

Did PSEU interfere with employee rights by promising benefits to bargaining unit employees if they decertified the Team­sters?

Did PSEU interfere with employee rights by promising economic benefits to bargaining unit employees based on agreements it made with the employer?

Did PSEU induce the employer to commit unfair labor practices by making agreements promising economic benefit with a union other than the exclusive bargaining representative?

Did PSEU interfere with employee rights by making misrepresen­tations of fact or law to bargaining unit employees with regard to negotiating retroactive pay?

Based upon the record presented, the Examiner concludes that the employer did not enter into any agreements with PSEU making any promises of benefits, and did not unlawfully direct individual computer searches as a result of an information request by the Teamsters. The employer did not interfere with employee rights or engage in unlawful assistance of a labor organization. The Examiner concludes that PSEU did interfere with employee rights and did induce an employer to commit an unfair labor practice, by promising benefits and making misrepresentations of fact and law to bargaining unit employees.

APPLICABLE LEGAL PRINCIPLES

Interference Violations under RCW 41.56.140(1)

The standards for interference under RCW 41.56.140 are well known. An employer may not interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed by the statute.

The standard for establishing an interference violation is whether the typical employee in similar circumstances reasonably could perceive the conduct as a threat of reprisal or force or promise of benefit related to the pursuit of rights protected by the statute. It is not necessary to show that the employee was actually interfered with or restrained in order to prevail on an interfer­ence allegation. No showing of intent or motivation is necessary to find an interference violation. Community College District 13 - Columbia Basin, Decision 9628-A (PSRA, 2007); Snohomish County, Decision 9834-B (PECB, 2008). A similar analysis exists under RCW 41.56.150, which bars labor organizations (either incumbents or rivals) from the same type of conduct.

Interference and Domination Violations under RCW 41.56.140(2)

Following Section 8(a)(2) of the NLRA, the collective bargaining statute at RCW 41.56.140(2) makes it an unfair labor practice for an employer to dominate or assist any labor organization by intending to control or interfere with their formation, or dominating the internal affairs of a union, or by intending to contribute financially to a union. Also barred is a showing of preference for one union versus another. Pierce County, Decision 1786 (PECB, 1983); Washington State Patrol, Decision 2900 (PECB, 1988); Washington State Department of Corrections, Decision 7870-A (PSRA, 2003). Violations under the statute, however, must show employer “intent” to assist one or more labor organizations. Community College District 13 - Lower Columbia, Decision 8117-B (PSRA, 2005).

Under the Washington Constitution, an individual or association cannot assume it has the right to use the property of the state or a political subdivision of the state. Const. art. VIII, § 5 and 7. The Commission has held that a union and its supporters cannot assume they have the right to use the employer’s computers or computer systems. Snohomish County, Decision 9799 (PECB, 2007); King County, Decision 6734-A (PECB, 2000). Conversely, an employer allowing a union to use employer property may commit a violation. Pierce County, Decision 1786 (PECB, 1983). In Pierce County, a union used employer office space, telephones, and time for union purposes, without the employer’s knowledge. Upon learning of the use, the employer took steps to terminate it. Despite lack of knowledge, the employer still committed a technical violation because the employer appeared to assist, support, or show prefer­ence for the union using the employer’s resources. In contrast, the Executive Director dismissed a complaint alleging interference when the employer gave an employee notice that the employee was not to use the employer’s letterhead, typewriter, or copy machines to process labor relations matters. City of Seattle, Decision 1355 (PECB, 1982).

Union Interference under RCW 41.56.150(1)

No showing of intent is required to prove an interference violation under RCW 41.56.150(1). Subsection (2), where a union might induce an employer to commit an unfair labor practice, requires some anti-union intent, and thus a higher burden of proof. State - Correc­tions, Decision 7870-A. To induce an employer to commit an unfair labor practice, a union must be requesting that the employer do something unlawful. Municipality of Metropolitan Seattle, Decision 2746-A (PECB, 1989). A union will commit a violation of RCW 41.56.150(2) by merely asking the employer to do something unlawful, “even if the employer has the good sense to refuse the request.” Shoreline School District, Decision 5560 (PECB, 1996). See alsoCity of Issaquah, Decision 9255 (PECB, 2006).

The Blocking Charge Rule

The blocking charge rule at WAC 391-25-370 allows the Executive Director of PERC to suspend representation proceedings in cases where the facts of an unfair labor practice complaint may consti­tute a violation, and where the unfair labor practice could improperly affect the outcome of a representation election. The discretion to implement the blocking charge, and thereby to suspend the election proceedings, is subject to review by the Commission.[2] The rule has been implemented here, and as of April 3, 2008, election proceedings have been suspended.

ANALYSIS

Background

This case arises out of negotiations for a successor contract in a King County bargaining unit represented by the Teamsters. The bargaining unit includes assessors/appraisers for commercial and residential property in King County.

The employees in this unit work at Seattle and Tukwila offices. Chief Deputy Richard Medved is head of the department of assess­ments section and sits at the bargaining table on the employer’s behalf.

The latest collective bargaining agreement between the employer and the Teamsters expired December 31, 2006. Bargaining for a successor agreement began near the end of 2006 and continued through 2007. There were over twelve negotiation meetings, and four mediation sessions, but the Teamsters and the employer reached no general agreement on the contract in that time. The record focused on the parties’ negotiation of retroactive pay, the payment of wages at increased rates for fiscal year 2007 (12 months) and the early months of 2008. The Teamsters made proposals to make wage increases for 2007 retroactive to January 1, 2007. King County also proposed pay increases retroactive to January 1, 2007, and in fact offered a one-range increase in both 2007 and 2009, skipping over 2008.

On February 22, 2008, PSEU filed a petition with PERC, seeking to decertify the Teamsters, and creating a question concerning representation under RCW 41.56.030. In compliance with WAC 391-25-140, King County and the Teamsters ceased bargaining activities soon thereafter. PERC’s representation coordinator convened a pre-hearing investigation conference on March 27, 2008, and an election vote was scheduled. But with the filing of this set of unfair labor practice charges, PERC invoked the blocking charge rule at WAC 391-25-370.

Issue 1 – Interference by the Employer

The Examiner does not find grounds for violations of RCW 41.56.140(1) and (2), because the employer pursued a neutral course after the decertification case was filed. Those reasons follow.

The E-Mail Exchanges – The Commission has ruled that employer-installed and sponsored e-mail and computer systems belong to the public employer, and not to the employees and their labor represen­tatives. As a result, certain limits may be imposed on the use of such communication systems. Snohomish County, Decision 9799 (PECB, 2007); Central Washington University, Decision 10118 (PSRA, 2008).

King County’s protocol concerning use of e-mail was mentioned first on February 27, 2008, soon after the representation petition was filed. In an e-mail to all employees in the department of assessments, Chief Deputy Medved cautioned those employees that:

Until this [petition with PERC] is resolved by the bargaining unit the department management team shall remain neutral and silent on the issue. Beginning immediately and remaining in force throughout the duration of this action please be advised that the use of department email, equipment and time shall be prohibited as it pertains to any discussion, evaluation or corre­spondence relating to the PERC petition and either of the respective union entities involved. This means exchanges of email, use of copiers or other equipment, and holding of discussions pertaining to this action during work hours is strictly forbidden. Failure to adhere to this directive may lead to disciplinary action. We ask that representatives of the two unions respect this policy as well.

Rob McCauley, Teamster business agent, sent a letter to Medved on March 14, 2008, asking him to execute a computer e-mail word-search for any communication “regarding decertifying Teamsters 763, certifying PSEU 519 as the bargaining agent, soliciting for meetings or activities by or for PSEU 519.” The letter indicated that McCauley had received reports that the employer’s e-mail system was being used to solicit authorization cards for PSEU, which McCauley characterized as an unfair labor practice. Additional e-mail correspondence from McCauley indicated that he was “requesting this info under RCW 41.56.” Medved soon called IT technician Wayne Nguyen, who informed him that a sweep-search of e-mails on the county-wide network would not be possible. However, Nguyen told Medved that a computer-by-computer search could accomplish the request. Each employee would have to be asked to make a search on their own stand-alone work station. Apparently, King County had handled similar requests before, on the same basis and with the same methodology. Medved ordered these searches; this generated only one question from a bargaining unit member wondering who asked for the searches. Medved informed that employee that the request had come from the Teamsters.

On March 27, 2008, McCauley requested that the employer stop the e-mail search. The record is devoid of any showing as to what the searches revealed or whether the employer shared any search results.[3] King County did not act as an “agent” of the Teamsters in telling one employee that the Teamsters requested the informa­tion. The Examiner concludes that bargaining unit employees could not reasonably predict any threat of reprisal or promise of benefit after complying with the information request. That conclusion is not changed because McCauley insisted that the search be stopped. King County handled the request in a neutral fashion, and followed its prior practice and a set of rules in doing so. No interference violation is made out here.

Alleged Comments of King County Officials–TheTeamsters contend that (1) PSEU and King County made misrepresentations of fact and law which interfered with bargaining unit employees and the negotiation process, and(2) the election process set off by the petition to PERC was interfered with and compromised by false claims stated in a letter from PSEU’s attorney.The Examiner does not find, however, that such interference came from the employer. That reasoning follows.

•  Rich Medved. Medved was the main supervisor involved here. Quoted above is the substance of Medved’s letter sent out soon after the decertification petition was filed. The intent and content of the County’s correspondence fairly set out the legal requirements for an employer during a question concern­ing representation; it must remain neutral and cease bargain­ing for employees involved in the representation proceeding. Medved’s e-mail does not violate that principle.

•  Karen Place. Place represented the employer at the bargaining table as principal spokesperson for the employer. She received an e-mail from McCauley on March 25, 2008. That e-mail included an attachment of a legal opinion and correspon­dence allegedly distributed to bargaining unit employees by PSEU, in which PSEU represented that the employer’s labor relations office agreed with PSEU’s analysis concerning retroactive pay. On March 26, 2008, Place e-mailed McCauley, telling him that “no one in Labor Relations has discussed the Department of Assessments contract with Dustin Frederick [PSEU business agent] or any representative of PSEU,” especially not the retroactive pay issue. She expressed the opinion that only a court of law or PERC could resolve the issue of retroactivity. Interestingly, there is no indication on this record that Place’s views and opinions were communicated to bargaining unit employees. As with Medved’s actions, the Examiner finds no interference or unlawful assistance on these facts.

•  Kathi Oglesby. Oglesby serves as liaison between labor groups and the County Executive, Ron Sims. There was no evidence that she sat at the bargaining table with the Teamsters. She responded to McCauley both on the retroactive pay issue and the e-mail search problem. Although Oglesby did not testify, McCauley quoted her as telling him that the e-mail search he asked for was not possible, and that even the County Executive needed to order individual searches to comply with public information requests involving his office. McCauley’s testimony indicated that he believed Oglesby. Oglesby also apparently told McCauley that she had talked to PSEU’s Frederick about retroactive pay in general, and had told him that “people had lost their retroactive pay” after decertifications in King County, but in other negotiations the employer “had found a way to make things up to them [employees involved in other decertifications].” There was no indication that the pending representation question involving the Teamsters and PSEU was specifically discussed.

The record does not indicate that Place or Oglesby ever communi­cated to bargaining unit employees on any of these issues. The record does not indicate that Medved communicated with employees concerning issues of retroactive pay. While Frederick clearly communicated with employees on the issue of retroactive pay, there is no indication that he communicated with employees on the e-mail issue.

Neither Oglesby nor Frederick testified. PSEU had every opportu­nity to rebut McCauley’s testimony concerning Oglesby’s claim that “no agreement” had been made. Without ruling that her comments constituted hearsay, the Examiner concludes that Oglesby’s version of events, as testified to by McCauley, probably comported with the truth. They were consistent with what Place told McCauley, as well as with Medved’s testimony. The Examiner concludes that the employer made no promises to PSEU, or any “agreement” with them with regard to retroactive pay.[4]

Issue 2 – Interference BY PSEU

Much of the campaigning after the petition was filed centered around whether the assessors’ employees would forfeit the ability to negotiate retroactive pay increases, largely for year 2007, if they changed unions.[5]

The “Christie Letter” Argument – “Christie Letters” are interim agreements between labor organizations and employers used to enable pay increases on a retroactive basis. Typically, they are sought where a new labor organization has been certified or recognized as the exclusive bargaining representative within the meaning of RCW 41.56.030(3).[6]

The “Christie Letter” idea was well known in 1971 when original language of RCW 41.56.950 was enacted. That section reads as follows:

RCW 41.56.950-Retroactive date in collective bargaining agreements allowable, when.

Whenever a collective bargaining agreement between a public employer and a bargaining representative is concluded after the termination date of the previous collective bargaining agreement between the same parties, the effective date of such collective bargaining agree­ment may be the day after the termination date of the previous collective bargaining agreement and all benefits included in the new collective bargaining agreement including wage increases may accrue beginning with such effective date as established by this section.

[1971 ex.s. c 187 § 1.]

As a consequence, an incumbent union always has the option to negotiate newer pay ranges beginning and effective the day after the expiring contract terminates, even though there may be seven or eight months with no new contract. In 1947, the Christie court did not rule that such a bargaining pattern offended Article II or VII of the state constitution. But in 1971 the Legislature thought that the “950" restriction was a prudent addition, for times when a new bargaining representative might be elected and recognized.

Within days of its filing of the decertification petition, the PSEU requested that its counsel, Kathleen Phair Barnard, prepare an opinion letter addressing the question “as to whether a new representative for collective bargaining between contracts would lose its ability to obtain pay increases for the period of time between contracts.” Barnard’s opinion letter, dated February 28, 2008, indicated that “The short answer is no.” This letter was apparently circulated to bargaining unit employees, and Rob McCauley attached a copy of the opinion letter and accompanying memo from Dustin Frederick to his e-mail of March 25 to Karen Place.

The Barnard opinion letter interprets Christie to mean that if an employer “and its employees” have a “prior understanding” that the salaries and compensation have not been fully determined, then:

As I understand the situation at hand, the County and the bargaining unit employees have had such an understanding since the expiration of the last contract. The negotiations between the County and the bargaining unit have included wage in­creases that would go back to the expiration of the most recent contract between the parties . . . .

(emphasis added)

Under this argument, if the employees selected PSEU as their new exclusive bargaining representative, they would be able to bargain for retroactive pay for bargaining unit employees, for a period as far back as the expiration date of the prior collective bargaining agreement between the employer and the Teamsters. But this conclusion misreads Christie as well as RCW 41.56.950, curiously missing from the PSEU analysis. The Examiner sees this case in the same light as King County, Decision 4236 (PECB, 1992), where PERC discussed the impacts of Christie in some detail. That decision accurately reconciled the possibility of retroactive pay for new bargaining representatives with the clear command of RCW 41.56.950, that the parties may look back only to the termination date of the previous collective bargaining agreement between the same parties. The “parties” to the collective bargaining agreement are the employer and the exclusive bargaining representative, not the employer and bargaining unit employees, as the Barnard letter indicates.

We must repeat here: Christie agreements are intentional and specific as to new bargaining relationships and do not “piggy-back” or attach from prior exclusive bargaining representatives or prior bargaining units. SeeCity of Seattle, Decision 9938-39 (PECB, 2007).[7]

PSEU’s campaign tactics – Taken together, the legal opinion letter from Barnard – and Dustin Frederick’s endorsement of it – was misleading to employees of the bargaining unit, and misleading on a critical issue. The incumbent Teamsters union had no Christie agreement with King County, and were not required to have one by virtue of RCW 41.56.950. PSEU was not the “same party” under the meaning of the statute, and hence a Christie agreement with King County would have been necessary for PSEU to secure any retroactive pay at all for bargaining unit employees. Under the terms of the Christie decision and the statute, PSEU could have secured retroactive pay only as far back as the date of its certification as exclusive bargaining representative. Thus, it could not have secured retroactive pay for 2007 or early 2008. The facts of this case very much emulate the situation in City of Issaquah, Decision 9255. It is clear that the attempt by PSEU to induce King County to commit this violation is a violation itself, even where the employer had the good sense not to enter into an agreement with a union that was not the exclusive bargaining representative of the employees in question.

PSEU’s communications to the bargaining unit with respect to the retroactive pay issue and its claims of an agreement with the employer constitute an interference violation under RCW 41.56.150(1). The typical employee in the bargaining unit could conclude that his or her retroactive pay would not be in jeopardy, and that King County had agreed to pay retroactively no matter who represented the assessor’s employees. Such is not the case.

REMEDY

The Examiner must determine in this case what an effective remedy would be. The normal remedies, including a “cease and desist” order and posting of notices, will be ordered. Because the record includes evidence that Frederick sent all bargaining unit employees the legal opinion letter from Barnard and his own memo assuring them that retroactive pay was not in jeopardy if they changed representatives, and because these communications included misrepresentations of law and fact, a more extraordinary remedy is appropriate in this case. In certain prior cases, we have required the employer to mail copies of the Order to bargaining unit employees, and we have required incumbent labor organizations to inform their members that an unfair labor practice has been committed. Here, however, the petitioning union – with no established bargaining rights and access to the employees in the bargaining unit – is held to answer for interference and inducement violations under RCW 41.56.150(1) and (2). Under such circum­stances, it is appropriate that this agency notify bargaining unit employees of the violation individually, by mail. The Public Employment Relations Commission shall provide and mail, at its own cost, a copy of the notice and an accompanying cover letter, to all bargaining unit members’ place of residence.

FINDINGS OF FACT

1.         King County (employer) is a public employer within the meaning of RCW 41.56.030(1).

2.         Teamsters Union Local 763 (Teamsters) is a bargaining repre­sentative within the meaning of RCW 41.56.030(3), and repre­sents a bargaining unit of assessors, technical employees and administrative personnel in the King County Auditor’s and Assessors office.

3.         Public Service Employees Union (PSEU) is a bargaining repre­sentative within the meaning of RCW 41.56.030(3).

4.         The employer and the Teamsters were parties to a collective bargaining agreement with a term ending December 31, 2006. Negotiations for a new agreement between the parties had been underway for about fourteen months, into February of 2008. The employer was represented at the bargaining table by Karen Place of the Labor Relations Office and Richard Medved, chief deputy of the department of assessments section.

5.         On February 22, 2008, a petition was filed by PSEU, raising a question concerning representation in the bargaining unit described in finding of fact 2. As a result of the petition, the employer and the Teamsters ceased bargaining for the petitioned-for employees.

6.         On February 27, 2008, Medved instructed employees in the bargaining unit that the County would “remain neutral and silent” regarding the PERC election case and PSEU’s petition. He barred employees from using office e-mail and office equipment concerning the petition and election during work hours and on work premises, subject to discipline.

7.         On March 14, 2008, as a result of reports that the employer’s e-mail system was being used to solicit authorization cards for PSEU, Teamster representative Rob McCauley asked Medved to execute a word-search for e-mail communications regarding the decertification petition. The employer’s system could not perform such a search on a county-wide or department-wide basis, so Medved ordered each employee to perform this search via their own desk computer stations. Such a search was consistent with the employer’s prior practice.

8.         By letter of March 27, 2008, McCauley objected to individual searches by employees on their own computers, and asked that the searches stop.

9.         Prior to March 16, 2008, Dustin Frederick of PSEU circulated a memo to bargaining unit employees containing an opinion from PSEU’s legal counsel. The legal opinion letter claimed that since King County “had an agreement” with “bargaining unit employees” to allow for retroactive wage payments for 2007, any union that succeeded the incumbent Teamsters would be entitled to negotiate such retroactive pay. That memo stated that “your retroactive pay is not in jeopardy by changing representation.”

10.       The Frederick memo of March 16 also stated that he had “discussed the retro issue with King County Labor Relations and they agree with the legal analysis/opinion I provided to you.”

11.       On March 25, 2008, McCauley sent an e-mail to Place, and attached the Frederick memo and legal opinion, and asking Place who from the employer’s labor relations office had spoken to Frederick and why.

12.       By an e-mail of March 26, 2008, to McCauley, Place denied that anyone from the labor relations office had discussed the retroactive pay issue with Frederick, Barnard or any other PSEU representative, or otherwise agreed with the PSEU legal opinion letter. The record does not indicate that bargaining unit employees were aware of Place’s response.

13.       Neither Place nor other representatives of the employer made agreements with the PSEU, nor did they make a promise of economic benefit in the event the incumbent union was voted out.

14.       A reasonable employee could perceive that PSEU’s memo and attached legal opinion letter described in findings of fact 9 and 10 constituted a promise of benefit and an arrangement to bargain retroactive wage increases. Such a perception, if acted upon, could have interfered with the employees’ selec­tion of their exclusive bargaining representative. The Memo and legal opinion described in findings of fact 9 and 10 contained misrepresentations of law and fact.

15.       PSEU’s communications with King County officials constituted an attempt to induce the employer to engage in actions that would have been unfair labor practices under the collective bargaining laws of the state of Washington.

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

1.         The Public Employment Relations Commission has jurisdiction of these matters under Chapter 41.56 RCW.

2.         By its actions described in findings of fact 6, 7, 12, and 13, King County did not violate RCW 41.56.140(1) or (2) and did not interfere with bargaining unit employees or dominate or assist a labor organization.

3.         By its actions after the filing of a question concerning representation, Public Safety Employees Union interfered with employees’ rights and attempted to induce King County to commit an unfair labor practice in violation of RCW 41.56.150(1) and (2).

ORDER

PUBLIC SERVICE EMPLOYEES UNION, its officers and agents, shall immediately take the following actions to remedy its unfair labor practices:

1.         CEASE AND DESIST from:

a.                   Interfering with employees’ rights in violation of RCW 41.56.150(1) by misleading statements of law with regard to retroactive pay, by claiming to bargaining unit employees that it had an agreement with King County concerning retroactive pay, and by otherwise promising an economic benefit in the event the Teamsters Union was decertified;

b.                  Inducing the employer to commit unfair labor practices in violation of RCW 41.56.150(2) by inferring to bargaining unit members that the employer had agreed to retroactive pay for bargaining unit employees if PSEU became their exclusive bargaining representative, and by inferring that the employer offered economic benefits if the Teamsters were voted out; and

c.                   In any other manner interfering with, restraining or coercing its employees in the exercise of their collec­tive bargaining rights under the laws of the state of Washington.

2.         TAKE THE FOLLOWING AFFIRMATIVE ACTION to effectuate the purposes and policies of Chapter 41.56 RCW.

a.                   Post copies of the notice provided by the Compliance Officer of the Public Employment Relations Commission in conspicuous places on the employer’s premises where notices to all bargaining unit members are usually posted. These notices shall be duly signed by an authorized representative of the respondent, and shall remain posted for 60 consecutive days from the date of initial posting. PSEU shall take reasonable steps to ensure that such notices are not removed, altered, defaced, or covered by other material.

b.                  Read the notice provided by the Compliance officer into the record at a regular public meeting of the governing body of the Public Safety Employees Union, and perma­nently append a copy of the notice to the official minutes of the meeting where the notice is read as required by this paragraph.

c.                   Notify the complainant and the employer, in writing, within 20 days following the date of this order, as to what steps have been taken to comply with this order, and at the same time provide the complainant with a signed copy of the notice provided by the Compliance Officer.

d.                  Notify the Compliance Officer of the Public Employment Relations Commission, in writing, within 20 days follow­ing the date of this order, as to what steps have been taken to comply with this order, and at the same time provide the Compliance Officer with a signed copy of the notice attached to this order.

ISSUED at Olympia, Washington, this 19^th day of September, 2008.

PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS COMMISSION

[SIGNED]

J. MARTIN SMITH, Examiner

This order will be the final order of the agency unless a notice of appeal is filed with the Commission under WAC 391-45-350.